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Comment
MODERNIZING THE WORKPLACE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT PUTS
THE FARAGHER-ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
IN CONTEXT
MATTHEW D. VENUTI*
I. ORIENTATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
THE FARAGHER-ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

AND

Imagine a woman struggling to make ends meet.1 She finds a parttime job working for the county so she can pay for her daughter’s cancer
treatment.2 She starts her new job, but every day when she comes into
work her supervisor attempts to kiss her, hug her, and massage her shoulders.3 When she returns from lunch, he questions her about where she
went and with whom she was eating.4 She wants his actions to stop, but
when she protests his conduct, he becomes hostile towards her.5 No one
else can report his actions because the two work alone in a building sepa* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A.
2017 Syracuse University. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Michael and
Jackie Venuti, whom I would like to thank for the unwavering support they have
provided me throughout law school. I would also like to thank the staff of the
Villanova Law Review for all of their hard work and thoughtful feedback
throughout the process of writing and publishing this Comment.
1. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018)
(describing plaintiff’s financial circumstances as “pressing”). The hypothetical featured in this introduction is based on the facts of Minarsky.
2. See id. at 314, 316 (discussing reasons Minarsky failed to promptly report
harassment). Minarsky stated that she feared she could lose her job if she spoke
up about the harassment and added that she was amidst a probationary period at
work, as every new employee was for the first six months of employment, which
heightened this fear. See id. at 314, 315 n.14. Her fears of losing her job were
aggravated by the cancer treatment her daughter was receiving at the time. See id.
at 314. Minarsky was further discouraged from reporting when her supervisor told
her she could not trust the County Clerk, the person to whom she was supposed to
report harassment. See id. at 316.
3. See id. at 306 (describing physical harassment faced by Minarsky). Minarsky
alleged that this conduct was unwelcomed and occurred nearly every week. See id.
at 306.
4. See id. at 307 (stating Minarsky’s supervisor would ask where Minarsky went
for lunch “and with whom she was eating”). Minarsky further alleged that her
supervisor would behave “unpredictably” at times, insisting she take time off and
then criticizing her for taking the time off. See id.
5. See id. (alleging supervisor would become hostile with Minarsky if she did
not answer his phone calls). Moreover, Minarsky described her supervisor as becoming “nasty” when she would assert herself, and that he was generally “unpredictable with his temperament.” See id. at 314–15.

(535)
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rated from the other employees.6 She ostensibly has two choices: allow
her supervisor to continue acting this way or report him and hope that she
does not get fired and lose the essential income from her job.7
The situation above is based on a real case, Minarsky v. Susquehanna
County.8 Sheri Minarsky, the employee, chose to remain silent in the face
of the ongoing harassment.9 The facts of her harassment surfaced only
when another supervisor overheard a conversation referencing Minarsky’s
harassment and filed a report.10 The case eventually went to court, and
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
granted her employer’s motion for summary judgment, citing the employer’s sexual harassment policy and Minarsky’s failure to promptly report her supervisor’s conduct.11 Minarsky appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which found that although her
fear of retaliation was subjective, a jury could find that her delay in reporting was reasonable.12
Minarsky’s case is just one of many that highlight society’s growing
concern with workplace harassment.13 In fact, the phenomenon dubbed
the “#MeToo movement” is driven by people who were once reluctant to
6. See id. at 314 (finding area in which Minarsky and her supervisor worked
was separate from offices of other employees).
7. See id. (finding Minarsky’s financial situation contributed to her reluctance
to report the harassment).
8. 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).
9. See id. at 308–09 (noting harassment was only reported after co-worker
overheard discussion about supervisor’s conduct and reported it himself).
10. See id. (stating co-worker reported Minarsky’s harassment).
11. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 3:14-CV-2021, 2017 WL 4475978, at
*6 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2017), adopting report and recommendation, 3:14-CV-2021, 2017
WL 4475981 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017), vacated and remanded, 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.
2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s purported justification for delay in reporting).
12. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 317 (holding in favor of Minarsky). The court
reasoned that whether Minarsky acted reasonably by failing to report her supervisor’s conduct was a question of fact for the jury, and therefore could not be decided as a matter of law. See id.
13. See id. at 313 n.12 (discussing cultural context of opinion). The Third
Circuit remarked that the Minarsky case was occurring amidst a “firestorm of allegations of rampant sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not reported by the victims.” See id. The court went on to note that “sex-based
harassment in the workplace [is] pervasive” and that “[n]early one third of American women have experienced unwanted sexual advances.” See id. (citing Gary
Langer, Unwanted Sexual Advances: Not Just a Hollywood Story, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17,
2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/unwanted-sexual-advances-hollywoodweinstein-story-poll/story?id=50521721 [https://perma.cc/2Q4F-YUUQ]); see also
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“[E]veryone knows by now that sexual harassment is a common problem in the American workplace . . . .”); Brandon L. Morrow & Edward G. Phillips,
The Faragher-Ellerth Framework in the #MeToo Era, 54 TENN. B.J., Feb. 2018, at 26
(discussing high-profile sexual harassment allegations which have recently come to
light).
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come forward and report their harassers.14 There is empirical evidence
documenting such reluctance, as one study showed that only 6% of employees subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace filed a formal
complaint.15 Another study showed that only 15% of those who reported
did so in what courts consider a timely manner.16 Yet another study attempted to explain this trend by setting forth a litany of reasons as to why
people delay their reporting.17 Many courts, however, do not consider
victims’ purported reasons for not immediately reporting harassing behavior when ruling on employers’ motions for summary judgment.18
In Minarsky, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-worked the standard for assessing whether an employee-plaintiff’s subjective fear of retaliation was reasonable by considering the broader context in which the
sexual harassment occurred.19 This standard cuts against the approach
taken by other courts, which usually require evidence of a credible threat
or fear while not taking into account the circumstances that may have prevented an employee from reporting.20 Specifically, the Third Circuit held
that a significant reporting delay may be justified even when the employee14. See, e.g., Daniel Wiessner, 3rd Circuit Cites #MeToo in Reviving Secretary’s Sex
Harassment Claim, 32 WESTLAW J. EMP’T, July 17, 2018, at 5 (reporting Third Circuit’s opinion in Minarsky cited #MeToo movement when referencing large numbers of sexual harassment cases that went unreported for years).
15. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 896–98 (2008) (citing U.S. MERIT SYS.
PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS,
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 30 (1995), https://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs
.aspx?docnumber=253661&version=253948 [permalink unavailable]) (noting studies showing infrequency of victims filing formal complaints in response to sexual
harassment).
16. See id. (citing David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws
in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265,
1280 (2001)) (discussing studies showing infrequency of filing formal complaints
in timely manner).
17. See L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 731 n.114 (2007) (citing DEP’T OF DEF., 1995 SEXUAL
HARASSMENT SURVEY (1996), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a323942
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z9P-MYXU]) (concluding courts are mistaken about
how women respond to sexual harassment). Hebert noted that “empirical evidence suggests that most women do not react to sexual harassment in the way that
courts apparently think that they should.” See id. at 734. Hebert went on to suggest that women may not report sexual harassment due to “fear of retaliation, concerns about confidentiality and whether any action would be taken, concern about
harm to the harasser, and concerns about harm to themselves, including suffering
damage to their careers, being blamed for the harassment, and not being believed.” See id. at 737 (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. supra note 15, at 35).
18. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 883 (citing courts’ failure to consider context when assessing reasonableness).
19. For a further discussion on the reasonableness standard set out in Minarsky, see infra notes 160–63 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of courts requiring evidence of a credible threat
or fear to substantiate an otherwise subjective belief, see infra notes 118–36 and
accompanying text.
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plaintiff’s fear is largely predicated on a subjective belief.21 The Minarsky
approach provides both employees and courts with more flexibility and is
more consistent with the case law and policy underlying the Faragher-Ellerth
defense.22
Part II of this Comment provides an overview and background of the
Faragher-Ellerth defense, including a discussion of the Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton23 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth24 opinions, as well as an
explanation of how lower courts have applied and interpreted the
Faragher-Ellerth defense.25 Part III discusses the Third Circuit’s opinion in
Minarsky, providing the facts of the case and the Third Circuit’s reasoning.26 Part IV analyzes the Faragher-Ellerth defense and describes how
courts’ application of the defense has barred relief for many plaintiffs.27
Part V argues that the Third Circuit’s approach in Minarsky is more consistent with the language of the Faragher and Ellerth opinions and policy underlying Title VII.28 Finally, Part VI asserts that the Minarsky approach
may result in a reduction of instances of workplace sexual harassment.29
II. A LONG CAREER: OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
FARAGHER-ELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

OF THE

Part II.A begins by providing an overview of workplace sexual harassment law.30 Part II.B provides an overview of the Faragher-Ellerth defense,
and discusses both the Faragher and Ellerth opinions.31 Lastly, Part II.C
discuss both prongs of the defense.32

21. For further discussion on Minarsky, see infra notes 137–63 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion on why the Minarsky approach should be viewed
as preferable to the approach of most circuits, see infra notes 203–09 and accompanying text.
23. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
24. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
25. For a discussion on the background of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, see
infra notes 30–136 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion on the Third Circuit’s opinion in Minarsky, see infra
notes 137–63 and accompanying text.
27. For further discussion on the problems associated with the standard
adopted by a majority of courts, see infra notes 164–90.
28. For further discussion of the Minarsky standard, see infra notes 191–202
and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion on the benefits offered by the Minarsky decision,
see infra notes 203–09 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 33–50 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 51–79 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 80–136 and accompanying text.
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A. Workplace Sexual Harassment and Defenses: An Overview of Current Law
There are two primary causes of action employees may bring under
Title VII if their supervisors sexually harass them in the workplace.33 First,
there is the hostile work environment claim.34 This cause of action may
be available “when an employer’s conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.”35 Second,
an employee may allege quid pro quo sexual harassment.36 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when “tangible job benefits are conditioned on
an employee’s submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse
job consequences result from the employee’s refusal to submit to the conduct.”37 The Supreme Court distinguished these two claims by stating that
quid pro quo harassment involves threats that were actually carried out
while hostile work environment harassment claims are based on threats
that were not.38
33. See, e.g., Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir.
2016) (recognizing there are “two primary types of sex-based discrimination
claims”). Both types of claims are brought under Title VII. See id.
34. See id. at 215–16 (describing elements of hostile work environment claim).
To succeed in a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must establish six
elements:
(1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was
based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and create an
abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was
objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person
would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be
so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.
See id. (quoting O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001)).
35. See RUSSELL J. DAVIS ET AL., 18 N.Y. JUR. § 95 (2d ed. 2019) (defining hostile work environment). In establishing a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable person would believe “the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” See id. Additionally,
plaintiffs must establish that they “subjectively perceived [the conditions] as abusive . . . and [the employer] created what a reasonable person would find to be an
objectively hostile or abusive environment.” See id.
36. See O’Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728 (describing quid pro quo sexual harassment). Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when “an employee or supervisor
uses his or her superior position to extract sexual favors from a subordinate employee, and if denied those favors, retaliates by taking action adversely affecting
the subordinate’s employment.” See id.
37. See Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1060 (10th Cir.
2009) (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1014 (10th Cir. 1987)).
38. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (distinguishing quid pro quo sexual harassment from hostile work environment). The
Court in Ellerth reasoned the distinction between quid pro quo harassment and
hostile work environment was of limited use but nevertheless may assist in differentiating cases in which threats were carried out from those where they were not. See
id.
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When employees allege sexual harassment under one of the two
aforementioned theories, they may bring a claim against both the supervisor who committed the alleged acts and their employer.39 Nonetheless, if
the employer or supervisor have not taken any tangible employment action against the victimized employee, like demoting or firing the employee, the employer may have a defense to the employee’s claims.40 That
is, the employer can plead an affirmative defense if it (1) has taken reasonable steps to prevent and correct the harassment and (2) can show that
the employee failed to avail his or herself of such protections.41 This defense is commonly known as the Faragher-Ellerth defense.42 As a general
matter, courts have historically ruled in favor of the employer on motions
for summary judgment when the employer has (1) created and distributed
a sexual harassment policy and (2) the employee either delayed reporting
or failed entirely to take advantage of the policy.43
Courts tend to reject the argument that an employee’s subjective fear
of retaliation is sufficient to justify a significant delay in reporting.44
When an employee makes this argument, courts require evidence to substantiate the employee’s fear, which often involves the employee showing
actual retaliation against the employee by the employer.45 Despite the potential reasonableness of waiting weeks, months, or, in extreme cases, even
years to report harassment, juries rarely have the opportunity to consider
39. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 781 (1998) (noting
plaintiff asserted claims against both her employer and supervisors). Supervisors
are sued as agents of the employer. See id.
40. See id. at 806 (describing availability of affirmative defense).
41. See id. at 807 (establishing employer defense to vicarious liability); see also
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (same).
42. See, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2018)
(referring to defense created by Supreme Court as Faragher-Ellerth defense).
43. See id. at 314 (acknowledging previous decisions finding “a plaintiff’s outright failure to report persistent sexual harassment is unreasonable as a matter of
law, particularly when the opportunity to make such complaints exists”); see also
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (“While proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance
as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”).
44. For a further discussion on circumstances which justify a plaintiff not reporting due to a subjective fear of retaliation, see infra notes 118–31 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307
(11th Cir. 2007) (reasoning failure to report harassment due to fear of “losing her
job or damaging her career prospects” is inadequate justification under FaragherEllerth defense). For a further discussion on actual instances of retaliation or other
credible threats justifying an otherwise subjective fear of retaliation, see infra notes
118–36 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss4/2

6

Venuti: Modernizing the Workplace: The Third Circuit Puts the Faragher-El

2019]

COMMENT

541

the underlying facts of workplace sexual harassment claims against employers because judges frequently decide these issues on motions for summary judgment.46 Thus, waiting as little as three weeks to report
harassment may be all it takes for employees to lose their chance to recover from their employer.47
To be sure, a plaintiff’s failure to make use of workplace safeguards
meant to protect against harassment is not itself fatal to his or her claim.48
Generally, courts recognize some justifications for delays in reporting and
in some instances hold that a delay was reasonable.49 These exceptions
may bring little comfort to employee-plaintiffs, however, as few are able to
produce the required evidence.50
B. History of the Faragher-Ellerth Affirmative Defense
The Faragher and Ellerth opinions are companion cases that were decided on the same day.51 In both cases, the plaintiffs sought to hold their
46. See, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 3:14-CV-2021, 2017 WL
4475978, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2017), adopting report and recommendation, 3:14-CV2021, 2017 WL 4475981 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017), vacated and remanded, 895 F.3d
303 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing case law supporting court’s rejection of Minarsky’s
argument as matter of law based on reporting delay of several years).
47. See, e.g., Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314 (acknowledging previous decisions finding “a plaintiff’s outright failure to report persistent sexual harassment is unreasonable as a matter of law, particularly when the opportunity to make such
complaints exists”). For a further discussion on the amount of time that constitutes an unreasonable delay, see infra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of how an employee’s delayed reporting of harassment
impacts the second prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, see infra notes 104–17
and accompanying text.
49. See Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307 (recognizing employee’s delay in reporting
may be justified in “extreme cases”); see also Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 751 (10th Cir. 2014) (reasoning employee’s failure to take advantage of established complaint procedures must be unreasonable “given the
totality of the circumstances”).
50. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 881 (noting difficulty involved in
excusing delay and failure to report).
51. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (decided on June
26, 1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (same). In Faragher,
the plaintiff, Beth Ann Faragher, was a lifeguard employed by the City of Boca
Raton. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. Faragher alleged that two of her supervisors,
Bill Terry and David Silverman, harassed her by “making lewd remarks, and by
speaking of women in offensive terms.” See id. Although the City had a sexual
harassment policy in place, it never provided its employees with the policy. See id.
at 781. Faragher sought to hold the City liable for the acts of her supervisors
under a Title VII claim. See id. at 780.
In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth, was a sales person working for Burlington
Industries in a two-person office in Chicago. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747. She alleged she was “subjected to constant sexual harassment” by her supervisor, Ted
Slowik. See id. Specifically, Ellerth claimed Slowik harassed her by repeatedly making comments about her body and implying her job would be a lot easier if she was
more sexual with him. See id. at 747–48. This behavior prompted Ellerth to quit
her job and eventually sue the City of Burlington under Title VII. See id. at 748–49.
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respective employers liable under a theory of hostile work environment.52
Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.53 From these two
cases, the Court effectively crafted the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense,
which employers can raise in response to an employee’s attempt to hold
them vicariously liable for workplace harassment committed by a supervisor.54 To successfully raise the defense, the employer must establish two
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”55 The employer bears
the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.56 Moreover, employee-plaintiffs can recover only the damages that
could not have been avoided through the exercise of their own reasonable
52. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (framing question as when employer may be
liable under hostile work environment claim); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749 (stating plaintiff’s claim was presented under theory of hostile work environment).
Faragher and Ellerth can be distinguished on the grounds that Ellerth involved a
supervisor who made comments about how he could make the employee-plaintiff’s
job more difficult, while Faragher did not. See 3 N. PETER LAREAU, ET. AL., LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 73.07[2][c] (2019). This difference may have made the
underlying conduct in Ellerth appear as though it were closer to a quid pro quo
case than it really was. See id. To be sure, the supervisor’s threats in Ellerth were
never carried out. See id.
53. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (bringing claim under Title VII); see also Ellerth (claiming employer violated Title VII). Title VII states “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
54. See John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Work Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1401, 1403 (2002) (describing Faragher and Ellerth). Prior to these two decisions, an “employer’s reasonable efforts to combat harassment” could prevent it
from being held liable for any harassment. See id. Because the Faragher-Ellerth defense is an affirmative defense, the employer must raise the defense in its answer to
the employee-plaintiff’s complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (providing timing
for raising affirmative defenses). “[A]n ‘affirmative defense is one that admits the
allegations in the complaint, but seeks to avoid liability, in whole or in part, by new
allegations of excuse, justification, or other negating manner.’ ” See Amy St. Eve &
Michael A. Zuckerman, The Forgotten Pleading, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 152, 161 (2013)
(quoting Reimer v. Chase Bank USA, 274 F.R.D. 637 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). When an
employer raises the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, it may move for summary
judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (allowing for summary judgment motions). The
employer will prevail on its motion for summary judgment where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” See id. at 56(a) (providing standard for summary judgment).
55. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778 (providing elements of Faragher-Ellerth
defense).
56. See Marks, supra note 54, at 1403 (discussing burden of proof under
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense).
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care.57 The Faragher-Ellerth defense is only available to employers accused
of maintaining a hostile work environment, not those accused quid pro
quo sexual harassment.58
Several Supreme Court cases provided the legal foundation for the
Faragher-Ellerth defense.59 In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,60 the
Court recognized an actionable claim against an employer for sexual harassment under Title VII.61 This decision recognized a claim for both quid
pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment.62 Although the Meritor decision touched on the issue of employer
liability, it did not confront the question of when an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment committed by its supervisors.63 The
Court subsequently expanded the applicability of the Meritor holding to
include same-sex harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.64
The question of employer liability under Title VII for a supervisor’s actions, however, remained unanswered and consequently became the focus
of the Faragher opinion.65
57. See id. at 1403–04 (noting limitations of liability under Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense).
58. See LAREAU, ET. AL., supra note 52, § 73.07[2][b] (recognizing limited
availability of Faragher-Ellerth defense). This limitation is based on agency principles and limits the application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense in cases where the
supervisors are clearly aided by the supervisor’s relationship with the employer,
which primarily includes cases where there was a tangible employment action
amounting to a quid pro quo claim. See id. This is in contrast to hostile work
environment claims, where it is less clear whether the supervisor was aided by that
same relationship. See id. If the plaintiff’s claim involves both a hostile work environment and tangible employment actions, the Faragher-Ellerth defense is unavailable. See id.
59. For a further discussion on the cases leading up to the Faragher and Ellerth
opinions, see infra notes 51–58 and supra notes 60–79 and accompanying text.
60. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, the plaintiff sought to hold the bank, her
employer, liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment that
occurred during her employment. See id. at 64. The Court ultimately found that
“a claim of ‘hostile environment’ sex discrimination is actionable under Title
VII . . . .” See id. at 73.
61. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (concluding past cases have established theory of liability for sexual harassment under Title VII). In Meritor, the Supreme
Court held an employer may be liable under Title VII when “ ‘sexual harassment
[is] so severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment
and create an abusive working environment.’ ” See id. at 786 (alteration in original) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). Prior to the Meritor opinion, Title VII had
not yet been applied to workplace sexual harassment cases. See Marks, supra note
54, at 1409–10 (discussing history of sexual harassment law).
62. See Marks, supra note 54, at 1409 (discussing claims established by Meritor
opinion).
63. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73 (holding lower court was incorrect in determining employer was absolutely liable for acts of its supervisors).
64. See 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Marks, supra note 54, at 1411–12 (noting cases
decided after Meritor).
65. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (“This case calls for identification of the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., for the acts of a supervisory
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In Faragher, the Court stated that Title VII was premised upon the
“basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action
by objecting employees”—the statute was intended to avoid harm to victims by encouraging employers to take preventative measures and by incentivizing employees to do what they can to mitigate harm.66 Citing Ford
Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,67 the Court found
the employee’s duty to mitigate harm under Title VII to be “imported
from the general theory of damages . . . result[ing] from violations of the
statute.”68 The Court then determined that it is appropriate under Title
VII, in at least some instances, to hold an employer liable for acts committed by a supervisor.69 This determination was predicated upon agency
principles; supervisors have more power to harass employees because of
their agency relationship with the employer.70 The Court explained that
the agency relationship delegates more power to supervisors than other
employees, and in turn supervisors may use their power to sexually harass
subordinates.71 The Court reasoned that although an employer does not
necessarily sanction the supervisor’s conduct, the employer is in the best
position to prevent the harassment.72
Adhering to Meritor, the Court was careful not to impose a standard
that held employers automatically liable for a supervisor’s acts.73 Conseemployee whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to employment discrimination.”).
66. See id. at 807 (discussing purpose of Title VII). The Court noted that
“[a]lthough Title VII seeks ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,’ its ‘primary objective,’ like that of
any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to
avoid harm.” See id. at 806 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)).
67. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
68. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (citing Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231)
(discussing employee’s duty to mitigate damages). In accordance with this principle, an employee should not be permitted to recover damages where such damages could have been avoided through reporting the conduct in question. See id.
69. See id. at 807–08 (finding employers may be liable for acts of supervisors in
certain circumstances).
70. See id. at 802–03 (discussing vicarious liability resulting from agency relationship between employer and supervisor). The Court reasoned that a supervisor’s agency relationship with an employer gives the supervisor power other
employees do not possess. See id. The Court mentioned that harassment by a coworker is inherently different because the employee can more readily reject the
conduct and push back against the co-worker, but they may be more hesitant to do
so where the perpetrator is a supervisor. See id. at 803. Employers can more readily protect against harassment by supervisors, as the employer has “greater opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.”
See id.
71. See id. (discussing workplace agency principles).
72. See id. (assessing parties in best position to prevent workplace sexual harassment from occurring).
73. See id. at 804–06 (discussing Meritor). In Meritor, the Court held “that an
employer is not ‘automatically’ liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates
the requisite degree of discrimination.” See id. at 804.
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quently, the Court reasoned that an affirmative defense could circumvent
strict liability, and under proper circumstances, shield employers from vicarious liability.74 The Court held that this affirmative defense could be
raised only where no tangible employment action had been taken against
the complaining employee.75 For the purposes of this standard, the Court
defined tangible employment action as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassigning with significantly different responsibilities, or making a decision that causes a
significant change in benefits.”76 Nonetheless, the Court held that where
74. See id. at 806 (reasoning affirmative defense adheres to Title VII precedent and principles).
75. See id. at 807 (precluding application of affirmative defense where tangible employment action has been taken). If tangible employment action is taken
against an employee, then the employer is automatically liable for the acts of it
supervisor. See id. at 790–91. The Court mentioned three justifications advanced
by other courts and approved by the Supreme Court for this imposition of liability.
See id. First, a theory of proxy which in essence holds “that when a supervisor
makes such decisions he ‘merges’ with the employer and his act becomes that of
the employer.” See id. at 790 (citing Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr.,
Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)). Next, some courts reason that employer
liability is appropriate in these instances “because the supervisor acts within the
scope of his authority when he makes discriminatory decisions in hiring, firing,
promotion, and the like.” See id. at 791 (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,
405 (7th Cir. 1990)). Lastly, some courts reason “the supervisor who discriminates
[using tangible employment actions] is aided by the agency relation[ship with the
employer].” See id. The Court recognized that “other courts have endorsed both
of the latter two theories.” See id. (citing Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d
1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Eddy Potash, Inc. v. Harrison, 524
U.S. 957 (1998), remanded sub nom. to Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. 158 F.3d 1371
(10th Cir. 1998); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)).
76. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (defining
tangible employment action). “When a supervisor makes a tangible employment
decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the
agency relation.” See id. at 761–62. Tangible employment action can have economic consequences that are more serious than those resulting from co-worker
harassment. See id. at 762. For this reason, any tangible employment action taken
by a supervisor is effectively taken by the employer, which justifies the imposition
of Title VII liability. See id.; see also 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 5:7 (2018) (“The [Ellerth] Court noted that a tangible employment action
in most cases inflicts direct economic harm, but it is clear that noneconomic actions may also meet the standard of a tangible employment action.”); Marissa A.
Mastroianni & Allan H. Weitzman, The Faragher Legacy: Still Going Strong After
Twenty Years of Attacks and Counter-Measures, 68 LAB. L.J., Sept. 6, 2017, at 2–5 (noting expansion of tangible employment action definition). Mastroianni and Weitzman argue plaintiffs have been successful in broadening the definition of tangible
employment action so that actions like “making an employee’s title less prestigious
than it was previously” constitutes tangible employment action. See id. at 4. These
two commentators also discuss a former circuit split regarding “whether conditioning employment on continued unwelcome sexual acts may be a tangible employment action, even where the supervisor’s behavior was not accompanied by an
independent cooperating official act by the employer,” a concept known as constructive discharge. See id. (citing Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158,
1173 (9th Cir. 2003)); Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2002);
Santiero v. Denny’s Rest. Store, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234–35 (S.D. Tex. 2011);
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tangible employment action has been threatened but not actually carried
out, those threats are properly considered part of a hostile work environment claim and do not preclude the employer from raising the defense.77
If the Faragher-Ellerth defense is available, there are two elements that
the employer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence: “(a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”78 In the
Court’s view, this affirmative defense was consistent with both Meritor,
which cautioned against imposing automatic liability onto an employer,
and the basic policies underlying Title VII.79
C. Application of the Faragher-Ellerth Affirmative Defense
1. The First Prong
The first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires that employers
take reasonable steps to prevent and promptly correct harassment.80 For
example, courts often find employers acted reasonably when they distribute a written sexual harassment policy to employees.81 A written polSpeaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224–26 (M.D. Fla. 2004)). “A
constructive discharge occurs when an employee’s working conditions are made so
intolerable so as to cause a reasonable employee to resign from his or her position.” See id. Weitzman and Mastroianni noted the Supreme Court resolved the
split in 2004 in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) by holding
“constructive discharge may qualify as a tangible employment action, so long as a
supervisor’s official act precipitates the constructive discharge.” See id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Constructive discharge is more difficult to prove than
hostile work environment. See LAREAU ET. AL., supra note 52, § 73.07[1] (noting
difficulty in establishing constructive discharge claims); see also Kerri Lynn Stone,
Consenting Adults?: Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment Are Faring
Better in Court than Those Who Say No . . . and Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 25, 33–35 (2008) (noting the Third Circuit’s holding in Suders v. Easton
split from the Second Circuit’s holding in Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.).
77. See LAREAU ET. AL., supra note 52, § 73.07[1] (clarifying how courts construe unfulfilled threats of tangible employment action). Further, “[t]his means
that the Faragher/Ellerth defense . . . is available to the employer in the case of
unfulfilled threats.” See id.
78. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778 (providing elements of Faragher-Ellerth
defense).
79. For a further discussion of the policies underlying the Faragher-Ellerth defense, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
80. For a further discussion on the steps employers can take to meet the requirements of the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, see infra notes 81–99
and accompanying text.81. See Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th
Cir. 2007) (citing Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1287
(11th Cir. 2003); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298–99
(11th Cir. 2000)) (noting “anti-discrimination policy prohibiting harassment,
which was effectively communicated to all employees,” with reporting requirements was not at issue and was “substantially similar to others that [the court] has
upheld”); see also Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1062 (10th

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss4/2

12

Venuti: Modernizing the Workplace: The Third Circuit Puts the Faragher-El

2019]

COMMENT

547

icy, however, is not always necessary, and in some circumstances may be
insufficient satisfy this prong.82 What makes a policy adequate can vary,
but the Eleventh Circuit has held that an employer must show “its sexual
harassment policy was effectively published, that it contained reasonable
complaint procedures, and that it contained no other fatal defect.”83 Still,
other courts look for particular factors such as whether employees were
aware of the policy, how the employer enforced the policy, and whether
the employer provided alternative channels of redress.84
Cir. 2009) (finding employer reasonably tried to prevent harassment because it
created policy that “prohibit[ed] sexual harassment, identifie[d] the complaint
procedure, and inform[ed] employees that disciplinary action might be taken
against those who violate that policy”); Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt., 246 F.3d
1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Madray, 208 F.3d at 1298–99) (stating employer
must show “its sexual harassment policy was effectively published, that it contained
reasonable complaint procedures, and that it contained no other fatal defect”);
Kunal Bhatheja & Blair T. Jackson, Easy as P.I.E.: Avoiding and Preventing Vicarious
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 656 (2014)
(describing steps employers may take to prevent vicarious liability).
82. See Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1314 (noting first prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense
is not necessarily met by presence of sexual harassment policy); see also Frederick,
246 F.3d at 1313–14 (citing Lissau v. S. Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177, 183 (4th Cir.
1998)) (“[A]n employer does not always have to show that it has a formal sexual
harassment policy to meet its burden of proof on this element.”). Compare
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (stating dissemination of written sexual harassment policy
may not be necessary in every case), with Bhatheja & Jackson, supra note 77, at
658–59 (“[A] sufficient policy will permit a court to make a strong presumption in
favor of finding that the employer took [reasonable preventative] measures.”). In
Faragher, the Court suggested that smaller businesses may exercise reasonable care
through implementing informal precautions against sexual harassment. See id. at
808–09 (recognizing the City was a larger employer, and therefore could not have
adequately addressed harassment absent a formal policy). Conversely, the Court
indicated that larger employers are far more likely to require formal procedures in
order to effectively protect against harassment. See id.
83. See Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1313–14 (citing Madray v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2000) (providing harassment policy requirements needed to satisfy first prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense).
84. See Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citing Farley v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997))
(stating court will look to “whether the employer made [the policy] well-known to
employees, vigorously enforced it and included alternate avenues of redress” when
determining whether policy is effective); see also Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d
710, 720 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding sexual harassment policy satisfied first prong
because it identified multiple individuals whom harassment could be reported to,
disseminated to all employees, and contained anti-harassment provision despite
not offering “training or counseling with regard to sexual harassment”); Gordon v.
Shafer Constr., 469 F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding sexual harassment
policy that identified three individuals to whom harassment could be reported satisfied first prong); Brokenborough v. District of Columbia, 236 F. Supp. 3d 41, 53
(D.D.C. 2017) (citing Taylor v. Chao, 516 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134–35 (D.D.C. 2007))
(first prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense may be satisfied by employer “maintaining
an effective anti-harassment policy that informs employees how to report allegations of harassment and conducting prompt investigations pursuant to that policy”); see also Hardy v. Univ. of Ill., 328 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (reasoning
neither Faragher nor Ellerth require sexual harassment policy to provide one specific reporting avenue and holding employer satisfied defense’s first prong by hav-
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To determine whether an employer took prompt action to correct
workplace harassment, courts first inquire whether the employer had
knowledge of the harassment.85 This knowledge may be actual or constructive.86 Constructive knowledge of sexual harassment exists when the
harassment is so pervasive that the employer should have known of its existence, even though the employer was not explicitly made aware.87 Moreover, actual knowledge can raise agency questions—the knowledge of one
employee does not always constitute knowledge on the part of the employer—as shown in Weger v. City of Ladue.88 In Weger, the Eighth Circuit
held that in cases where a sexual harassment policy specifies “the individu-

ing policy permitting employees to report how they felt most comfortable);
Madray, 208 F.3d at 1298 (“The employer’s size, location, geographic scope, organizational structure, and industry segment are just some of the characteristics that
impact the analysis of whether the complaint procedures of an employer’s antiharassment policy adequately fulfill Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”); Bhatheja &
Jackson, supra note 81, at 659 (suggesting absence of certain factors may lead to
finding that sexual harassment policy is inadequate). Courts have also required
policies to include a “provision for the requirement of training” and a “reasonable
complaint process” with a statement that “prompt, corrective action will be taken
after a complaint is reported.” See id. Bhatheja and Jackson suggest that a failure
to provide an adequate definition of sexual harassment could also preclude an
employer from establishing the second prong of the defense if the employee was
unaware that the conduct at issue constituted sexual harassment under the policy.
See id. at 660. Similarly, if the employer fails to incorporate an anti-retaliation provision into its policy, then employees may be justified in claiming they feared retaliation and therefore did not report the harassment. See id. at 661–62. Finally, these
two commentators argue that employers can increase the likelihood a court will
find a policy adequate if they create “multiple avenues of complaint,” allow for
informal complaining, and require that the employee to whom the harassed employee reports is required to pass the information on to someone who may act on
it. See id. at 662–67.
85. See Weger, 500 F.3d at 720–21 (beginning analysis of correction prong with
inquiry of whether employer had knowledge of harassment); see also Swenson v.
Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229
F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“An employer cannot be held liable for misconduct
of which it is unaware.”); Madray, 208 F.3d at 1299 (“In applying the Faragher affirmative defense, we have noted that ‘the employer’s notice of the harassment is
of paramount importance . . . .’ ” (quoting Dees v. Johnson Controls World Servs.,
Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 422 (11th Cir. 1999))).
86. See Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259–61 (11th Cir. 2003)
(examining whether employer had constructive knowledge of alleged
harassment).
87. See id. at 1259 (defining constructive knowledge in context of FaragherEllerth defense (citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. 277 F.3d 1269, 1278
(11th Cir. 2002))).
88. 500 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2007). But see Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s
Office, 743 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 2014) (“In assessing whether an employer was negligent in dealing with known harassment, ‘[a]ctual knowledge will be demonstrable in most cases where the plaintiff has reported harassment to management-level
employees.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 144
F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998))).
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als to whom notice of harassment must be given, [the awareness of other
employees is] not relevant to the actual notice inquiry.”89
Once an employer has knowledge of harassment, a duty to promptly
correct the harassment arises.90 Some initial steps an employer may take
to correct harassment include limiting contact between the alleged harasser and reporting employee and beginning and investigation into the
alleged misconduct.91 An employer is deemed to have acted promptly
when it “immediately” takes steps to correct harassment, which in some
cases may be less than two weeks.92 Conversely an employer’s choice to
delay an investigation may constitute failure of this requirement, rendering the defense unavailable.93 But an employer’s delay is not always dispositive—an employer who delays beginning an investigation may still
prevail so long as it has a legitimate reason for doing so, such as taking
time to hire an investigator.94

89. See id. at 721–22 (citing Watson, 324 F.3d at 1259) (deeming knowledge of
other employees insufficient to establish employer’s actual knowledge).
90. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (requiring
employer to act promptly to correct known harassment).
91. See Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir.
2009) (describing initial steps taken by employer).
92. See id. at 1062 (holding immediately beginning investigation into alleged
harassment, providing employee-plaintiff with new supervisor, and demoting supervisor about two weeks after investigation concluded was sufficient to satisfy first
prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense); see also Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62,
at 8 (“[T]o effectively counter an attack on the obligation to promptly correct
harassment, an employer must begin its investigation almost immediately after receiving notice of a harassment complaint.”). In Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., the Second Circuit has found an employer acted immediately when it began investigating
harassment the day the complaint was made. See Bhatheja & Jackson, supra note
81, at 672 (citing Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc. 115 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Moreover, “so long as the plaintiff reported the harassment to a supervisor and the
supervisor is required to report the harassment to one of the designated employees, the ‘clock starts ticking’ from the moment the supervisor learns of the harassment.” See id. at 672–73.
93. See Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62, at 8–9 (citing EEOC v. Mgmt.
Hosp. of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 435 (7th Cir. 2012)) (asserting waiting one
month to begin investigation will cause courts to hold employer did not promptly
investigate harassment complaint).
94. See id. at 9, 19 n.80 (citing INVESTIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVING COMPLAINTS, CHAPTER 4: TIMING IS EVERYTHING, 2002 WL
33985522 (2015) [hereinafter, TIMING IS EVERYTHING])) (discussing effects of employer investigations into harassment). An employer may also successfully justify a
delay in investigating complaints of sexual harassment by showing the person best
equipped to handle the complaint was on vacation or was otherwise unavailable.
See id. at 9. A delay is more likely to be justified if the allegations were of “nonphysical conduct or if the behavior occurred in the past and has stopped.” See
TIMING IS EVERYTHING, supra. Courts are more likely to find a delay in investigating
reasonable if the employer updates the employee who filed the complaint on the
status of the employee’s complaint and information on any delays, including the
reasons for such delays. See id.
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In addition to being prompt, an employer’s corrective measures must
also be adequate.95 In making the determination of whether particular
actions are adequate, the Eighth Circuit considers various factors including whether the employer’s actions actually caused the harassment to
cease.96 More severe harassment warrants more significant action on the
part of the employer, but the employer does not always have to terminate
the harasser.97 Some appropriate actions may include separating the employee and harasser, requiring the harasser to attend anti-harassment
training, or laterally transferring the victim.98 Some circuits have found
that measures that put plaintiffs in a less favorable position than they were
prior to reporting are per se inadequate.99
2. The Second Prong
The second prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires that employers demonstrate victims unreasonably failed to avail themselves of corrective measures.100 Courts have been consistent in their application of the
second prong, embracing the Supreme Court’s guidance in Faragher that
“a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”101 When
courts grant summary judgment in favor of an employer after an employee
95. See Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62, at 3 (noting Faragher-Ellerth
“affirmative defense [has been rendered] inapplicable when employers fail to take
appropriate preventative and corrective measures”).
96. See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999)) (“Factors the Court
may consider when assessing the reasonableness of [an employer’s] remedial measures include the amount of time elapsed between the notice of harassment . . .
and the remedial action, and the options available to the employer such as employee training sessions, disciplinary action taken against the harasser(s), reprimands in personnel files, and terminations, and whether or not the measures
ended the harassment.”); see also Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62, at 10
(“Remedial steps that fail to promptly correct and prevent harassment will not
withstand a plaintiff’s attacks.”).
97. See Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62, at 10 (“Notably, however, the
more severe and/or physically harassing behavior at issue, the more a drastic remedy is required.”); cf. id. (noting employer may, in some instances, be required to
limit interactions between supervisor and employee).
98. See id. (discussing remedial measures courts have found appropriate, including anti-harassment training, separating the parties involved, and laterally
transferring the victim).
99. See Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 811 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A
remedial measure that makes the victim of sexual harassment worse off is ineffective per se.” (quoting Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir.
1990))); see also EEOC v. Cromer Food Serv., 414 F. App’x 602, 608 (4th Cir. 2011)
(holding employer’s offer to transfer plaintiff, which came eight months after the
employer received the complaint, was per se ineffective).
100. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (defining second prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense).
101. See id. at 807–08 (providing guidance for application of second prong of
Faragher-Ellerth defense).
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fails to report harassment, they often cite to Title VII’s policy of incentivizing employees to mitigate harm.102 But, if the employer has knowledge of
the ongoing harassment, its failure to prevent the harassment will excuse a
plaintiff from his or her obligation to mitigate the harm.103
a. Delays Put Employees on Thin Ice
If the first prong of the defense is met, an employer can usually establish the second prong if it can show that the employee delayed acting
upon an anti-harassment policy.104 The exact amount of time considered
“unreasonable” for taking advantage of a policy varies, but one district
court has found a mere seventeen days to be an unreasonable delay.105
Courts more typically find that delays of several months are unreasona102. See, e.g., Mativa v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269 (4th
Cir. 2001) (reasoning employee’s failure to report sexual harassment could lead
other employees “to infer that such behavior is acceptable in the workplace”).
103. See Clark v. United Parcel Serv., 400 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“[R]egardless
of whether the victimized employee actively complained, prong one of the defense
ensures that an employer will not escape vicarious liability if it was aware of the
harassment but did nothing to correct it or prevent it from occurring in the
future.”).
104. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing Third Circuit “has routinely found the passage of time coupled with the
failure to take advantage of the employer’s anti-harassment policy to be unreasonable”); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 701 (2000) (“[A] delay in complaining can be
just as fatal to a plaintiff’s case as a total failure to complain.”).
105. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 723 (discussing Conatzer v. Medical Prof’l
Bldg. Serv., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Okla. 2003)). Hebert noted that in
Conatzer, the Northern District of Oklahoma found the plaintiff acted unreasonably by waiting seventeen days from the first incident of harassment to file a complaint, even though the plaintiff filed a formal complaint within four days of the
second incident. See id. (citing Conatzer, 255 F. Supp. at 1269–70). Hebert also
discussed the court’s finding that another supervisor witnessing the first incident
of alleged harassment was insufficient to put the employer on knowledge of a hostile work environment. See id. (citing Conatzer, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 1269). But see
Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 880 (citing Marsicano v. Am. Soc. of Safety
Eng’rs, No. 97 C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1998)) (noting one
“extreme” case where court held seven-day delay was too long). In Marsciano, the
plaintiff alleged she was harassed by her supervisor starting on the second day of
her job. See Marsciano, 1998 WL 603128, at *1–2. The harassment was largely verbal but included one lunch during which the supervisor touched her hair and face
as he helped her put on her coat. See id. at *2–3. The supervisor suggested they
would be going to more lunches and dinners together despite the plaintiff’s discomfort with the experience to the point she felt sick. See id. at *3. The plaintiff
reported the harassment in compliance with the employer’s procedure seven days
after the last instance of harassment. See id. at *7. The court found the seven-day
delay unreasonable because the executive director of the society approached the
plaintiff the morning of the lunch, which the court viewed as an i nformal opportunity to report the harassment and prevent the harassment that occurred during
the lunch. See id. at *7 (finding “unexpected” instance of director inquiring “how
[plaintiff] was settling in . . . . presented significant opportunity for preventative
action”). The court also reasoned the fact the director initiated the conversation
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ble.106 Whether a delay is justifiable may depend on the severity of the
harassment, with more severe harassment typically warranting prompter
reporting.107 Although employers bear the burden of establishing the
Faragher-Ellerth defense, courts often require the plaintiff who delayed reporting to prove that the delay was reasonable.108
Almost every circuit has found that where an employee-plaintiff delays
reporting sexual harassment due to some subjective fear, such as fear of
retaliation, that fear on its own is insufficient to excuse a failure to report
sexual harassment.109 Some courts have categorically rejected the justifications that “generalized fears” or fears of embarrassment are sufficient to
explain a delay in reporting.110 Other plaintiffs have attempted to explain
may have made informal reporting at the time “less daunting for [the plaintiff]
than instigating a formal complaint of her own motion.” See id.
106. See Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(holding employee-plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of preventive or
corrective opportunities by waiting three months to report harassment despite
most recent instance of harassment occurring just two days prior to her report).
But see Hardy v. Univ. of Ill., 328 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding delay of six
weeks not unreasonable where employee attempted to address harassment directly
with the harassing supervisor prior to formally reporting).
107. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of
Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 22 (2003)
(noting severity of harassment may affect reasonableness inquiry). Grossman
stated that “[c]ourts have not been sympathetic to claims that the victim was waiting to see if the behavior continued or to gather more evidence of harassment.”
See id.
108. See, e.g., Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating employer “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that [the employee] acted unreasonably in failing to avail herself of the company’s internal
complaint procedures”). Despite stating the employer bears the burden of sustaining the Faragher-Ellerth defense, the court continued:
Once an employer has satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that an
employee has completely failed to avail herself of the complaint procedures, the burden of production shifts to the employee to come forward
with one or more reasons why the employee did not make use of the
procedures. The employer may rely upon the absence or inadequacy of
such a justification in carrying its ultimate burden of persuasion.
Id.
109. See IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 6:19 (2018) (“Several courts have reasoned
that subjective fear of retaliation is not an excuse for failing to report sexual harassment.”). Bodensteiner and Levinson cite cases from the First, Second, Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits that have held subjective fears of retaliation do not excuse a delay in reporting. See id.; see also Harper v.
City of Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist., 149 F. App’x 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding
plaintiff’s fears of retaliation were unsubstantiated); Jernigan v. Alderwoods Grp.,
489 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1198 (N.D. Or. 2007) (holding plaintiff acted unreasonably
by failing to report harassment at meeting with both regional manager and harassing supervisor because she felt intimidated by supervisor’s presence at meeting).
110. See Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Mativa v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001)) (“In short, for
policy reasons representing a compromise, more than ordinary fear or embarrassment is needed.”); see also Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 315 (citing Pinkerton v. Colo.
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delays by claiming fear of retaliation, but absent a “credible threat,” courts
have rejected this argument as well.111 Still, some plaintiffs argue they
were afraid that if they complained, then their complaint would have not
been taken seriously; however, courts seek evidence that this fear was
credible.112
At least the Second and Seventh Circuits have found that plaintiffs
have acted unreasonably when their reporting delay was caused by a subjective fear of discomfort or embarrassment.113 Accordingly, employeeplaintiffs cannot escape their obligations under this prong simply by arguing they were concerned about their co-workers perceiving them negatively for reporting the harassment.114 In a similar vein, at least seven
circuits have held that a “generalized fear” of retaliation is insufficient to
overcome the second prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.115 A generalized fear of retaliation is one not supported by objective evidence in the
Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“Several courts have held
that a generalized fear of retaliation is insufficient to explain a long delay in reporting sexual harassment.”).
111. For a further discussion on credible threats of retaliation justifying a delay in reporting, see infra notes 118–36 and accompanying text.
112. For a further discussion of courts finding fears that reporting harassment
would be futile do not excuse a delay in reporting, see infra notes 132–36 and
accompanying text.
113. See Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)
(reasoning victim’s failure to report sexual harassment cannot be justified by concerns regarding how co-workers would react); see also Hebert, supra note 17, at 724
(“Courts tend to reject employee’s claims that they did not report sexual harassment because of the discomfort and embarrassment associated with talking about
the sexual conduct to which they have been subjected.” (citing Shaw v. AutoZone,
Inc., 180 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999))).
114. See Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295–96 (citing finding employee-plaintiff acted
unreasonably in delaying reporting delay over fears of co-workers’ reactions).
115. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 315 (“We distinguish this situation from one in
which the employee’s fear of retaliation is generalized and unsupported by evidence.” (citing Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir.
2009))); see also Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063 (stating “many of our sister circuits have
stated that a generalized fear of retaliation simply is not sufficient to explain a long
delay in reporting sexual harassment” (citing Thornton v. Fed. Ex. Corp., 530 F.3d
451 (6th Cir. 2008))); Thornton, 530 F.3d at 351 (ruling in favor of employer where
employee’s fears were unsubstantiated by evidence).
Courts often use the terms generalized fear, subjective fear, and nebulous fear
interchangeably in this context. See Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1328 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (reasoning plaintiff’s fear was “not merely ‘generalized,’ . . . ‘nebulous,’ . . . or ‘subjective’ ” because plaintiff presented evidence
showing her fear was credible (citation omitted) (citing Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003))). Accordingly, the term
“generalized fear” can be conflated with “subjective fear,” which a majority of circuits have also rejected as being sufficient to overcome the second prong of the
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp.,
240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that delay in reporting was reasonable in light of fact “she feared retaliation and doubted her
complaints would be taken seriously”); see also Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d
806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (reasoning plaintiff’s subjective fear of retaliation is insufficient to excuse her duty to promptly report under Faragher-Ellerth defense).
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record.116 Therefore, courts may require plaintiffs to produce evidence to
substantiate their fear such as testimony or other indications that an express threat has been made.117
b. Good Enough to Get the Job Done: Credible Threats of Retaliation
May Justify an Employee’s Delay in Reporting
In situations where plaintiffs assert that a subjective fear prevented
them from promptly reporting harassment, courts typically seek evidence
of a “credible threat.”118 A credible threat is one that is supported by
evidence in the record, such as the threat of physical harm or termination.119 A credible threat can effectively make an otherwise subjective fear
into an objective one.120 While an express threat is often considered credible, an employee’s feeling of fear may still be credible even absent an
actual threat.121 For example, in Burns v. Johnson,122 the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit found the employee-plaintiff’s coworkers’ fears of
“participat[ing] [in] the [employer’s] investigation” added credibility to
the employee-plaintiff’s otherwise subjective fear.123
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Walton v.
Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.124 seemed to actually require an express
116. See Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267 (categorizing plaintiff’s fear as generalized
when she failed to promptly report harassment because she “feared [her supervisor] would find out and retaliate against her” and because her supervisor was
friends with the company’s president).
117. See Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2003)
(finding several other courts require “concrete” or “credible” reason to believe
employer would not take complaint seriously or retaliation would be suffered as
result of complaining (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295))).
118. See, e.g., Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290–91 (refusing to find plaintiff’s failure to
report harassment reasonable without evidence of credible threat).
119. See Mastroianni & Weitzman, supra note 62, at 13 n.126 (interpreting
Walton as reasoning that termination or physical harm would constitute a credible
threat).
120. See id. at 13 (“The alleged victim must establish a credible fear of retaliation.” (citing Walton, 347 F.3d at 1291))); see also Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d
710, 725 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring “truly credible threat of retaliation” to excuse
delay in reporting (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed, 333 F.3d at
36 (1st Cir. 2003))); Reed, 333 F.3d at 36 (stating credible fear of adverse employment action stemming from filing of complaint is needed to excuse significant
delay in reporting (citing Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295
(2d Cir. 1999))); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating “[a] credible fear must be based on more than . . . [a] subjective belief”).
121. See Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiff’s
fear of retaliation enough to overcome employer’s motion for summary judgement
because others also had fear of retaliation for mere participation in harassmentinvestigation).
122. 829 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016).
123. See id. at 6–7 (finding support for plaintiff’s assertion that her acts were
reasonable).
124. 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003).
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threat of retaliation in order to find the employee’s fear credible.125 In
that case, Luanne Walton was employed as a pharmaceutical sales representative by Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, and George Mykytiuk was her
supervisor.126 Mykytiuk sexually assaulted Walton twice after making several failed advances on her.127 The record revealed that prior to sexually
assaulting her, Mykytiuk brandished a gun when alone with Walton on at
least one occasion, which Walton claimed intimidated her.128 Despite
these facts, the court found there was no credible threat of retaliation because Mykytiuk never expressly stated that he would shoot Walton if she
reported his conduct.129 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that Walton’s failure to report the harassment was unreasonable.130 Thus, while
courts assess what constitutes a “credible threat” differently, they often require objective evidence to corroborate the victim’s fear.131
In some cases, a failure to report sexual harassment may be excused
when the employee reasonably believes such efforts would be futile.132
125. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 727 (discussing Walton in context of reasonable delays in reporting).
126. See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1274–75
(11th Cir. 2003) (discussing factual background of case). Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical is owned by Johnson and Johnson. See id. at 1277.
127. See id. at 1276 (discussing factual background). Specifically, Mykytiuk
tried to kiss the plaintiff and physically grabbed her several times; Walton responded by verbally rejecting him. See id.
128. See id. at 1291 n.17 (stating plaintiff’s assertion “that the gun ‘intimated
her’ ”); see also id. at 1275–76 (discussing facts surrounding cause of plaintiff’s purported fears of intimidation). The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is not entirely clear
on what Mykytiuk did with the gun; it only says he “showed” her the gun on one
occasion and removed it from a box and talked about it with her on another. See
id. She provided no indication that Mykytiuk expressly threatened her with the
gun. See id. at 1296 n.17.
129. See id. at 1290 (finding no evidence to support reasonableness of plaintiff’s fear of retaliation). The court held “Walton’s subjective fears of reprisal do
not excuse her failure to report Mykytiuk’s alleged harassment.” See id. at 1290–91
(citing Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)).
130. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 727 (discussing Walton court’s reasoning
and holding). Hebert argued that the court conceded the alleged harassment was
“particularly traumatic” and acknowledged the supervisor’s brandishing of the gun
in her presence yet dismissed her concerns as “unsupported subjective fears.” See
id. Hebert points out that a court could view the first instance of rape as evidence
that Walton would suffer future physical harm if she reported the conduct. See id.;
see also Walton, 347 F.3d at 1291 (reasoning supervisor “never told Walton that her
job was in jeopardy, nor did he threaten her with physical harm”).
131. Compare Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 6–7, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding
evidence of credible threat based on co-workers’ fears of participating in harassment investigation), with Walton, 347 F.3d at 1276 (requiring express threat of retaliation for threat to be credible).
132. See Douyon v. New York City Dep’t of Edu., 665 F. App’x 54, 58 (2d Cir.
2016) (explaining that evidence of similar complaints being “ignored or resisted”
may justify delay in reporting (citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243 (2d
Cir. 2001))); see also Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 433 F.3d 428, 437 (5th Cir.
2005) (conceding employee’s failure to bring complaint may be justified when
“employee believes that bringing a subsequent sexual harassment complaint would
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Even in these situations, the First and Second Circuits have required the
plaintiff’s fear of not being taken seriously to be credible.133 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a credible fear may be established if the “employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints” in the
past.134 In some cases, the employee may be required to give the employer multiple chances to correct the harassment before a court will determine that further reporting was objectively futile.135 Lastly, a social
relationship between the supervisor and entity or individual to whom the
plaintiff would report is insufficient to justify a fear that reporting sexual
harassment would be futile.136
III. REVISITING WORKPLACE POLICIES: MINARSKY V.
SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY
Breaking from the fairly consistent pattern requiring credible threats,
the Third Circuit in Minarsky held a jury could find the employee-plaintiff
acted reasonably even though her fear of retaliation was subjective.137
Before the case reached the Third Circuit, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer-defendant after determining that
be futile, or ‘it becomes objectively obvious that the employer has no real intention
of stopping the harassment, the harassed employee is not obligated to go through
the wasted motion of reporting the harassment’ ” (quoting Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., 274 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2001))); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36
(1st Cir. 2003) (acknowledging credible fear that plaintiff’s complaint would not
be taken seriously may excuse delay in reporting). But see Hebert, supra note 17, at
724–25 (“Courts have . . . been unreceptive to employees’ claims that they believed that reporting would be futile-even when employees have some justification
for that belief, such as information obtained from other employees.”).
133. See Szwalla v. Time Warner Cable, LLC, 670 F. App’x 738, 740 (2d Cir.
2016) (stating plaintiff “did not demonstrate that she had a credible fear that a
complaint would be ignored . . .”); see also Reed, 333 F.3d at 36 (“Claims of futility
or adverse consequences have to be ‘credible.’ ” (quoting Caridad v. Metro-N.
Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999))); Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295 (finding plaintiff’s delay in reporting “was not based on a credible fear that her complaint would not be taken seriously”).
134. See Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295) (providing circumstances in which credible fear may exist). The Leopold court also recognized that evidence of “adverse actions against
employees in response to [complaints of harassment]” may be sufficient to establish a credible fear. See id. The Second Circuit reasoned the plaintiff’s argument,
that the plaintiff did not report the harassment in part because another “coworker’s vague and ambiguous complaint was not taken seriously,” was insufficient
to establish a credible fear. See id.
135. See Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., 274 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2001)
(finding plaintiff was obligated “to give the company another opportunity to remedy the problem before deciding that she could not work there anymore”).
136. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir.
2001) (rejecting “argument that reporting sexual harassment is rendered futile
merely because members of the management team happen to be friends”).
137. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2018)
(holding jury could find plaintiff’s subjective fear of retaliation reasonable).
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it met both prongs of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.138 The Third Circuit
reversed, ultimately holding a plaintiff’s failure to promptly report sexual
harassment is not per se unreasonable.139
A. A Difficult Job: The Facts of Minarsky
Sheri Minarsky worked for the Susquehanna County Department of
Veterans Affairs as a part-time secretary.140 Minarsky alleged her supervisor, Thomas Yadlosky, sexually harassed her throughout the course of her
employment.141 The alleged harassment included Yadlosky’s attempts to
kiss her, along with him “approach[ing] her from behind and embrac[ing] her,” massaging her shoulders, touching her face, questioning
her about where she went for lunch and with whom she was eating, calling
her to ask her personal questions when she was not at work, and sending
sexually explicit emails to her at work.142 Minarsky further alleged that
the conduct became worse as time went on.143
The County Clerk reprimanded Yadlosky when he became aware of
other incidents of harassment, specifically, after another female employee
complained Yadlosky harassed her.144 These incidents culminated in verbal reprimands, but the County took no subsequent action against
Yadlosky.145 Minarsky was aware that the County Clerk reprimanded
Yadlosky on one of these two occasions.146 According to Minarsky,
Yadlosky attempted to harass several other women as well.147
The County had a sexual harassment policy in place and Minarsky
admitted she read the policy on her first day of work.148 The policy required employees to report sexual harassment to their supervisor, unless
138. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 3:14-CV-2021, 2017 WL 4475978,
at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017), adopting report and recommendation, 3:14-CV-2021,
2017 WL 4475981 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017), vacated and remanded, 895 F.3d 303 (3d
Cir. 2018) (recommending ruling in favor of employer).
139. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 306 (reversing district court’s decision).
140. See id. (stating Minarsky worked “Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays”).
141. See id. at 306, 316 (noting this harassment continued for three and a half
years).
142. See id. at 306–07 (describing specific harassment Minarsky faced both at
and away from work).
143. See id. at 307 (pointing to Minarsky’s assertion that Yadlosky’s harassment
intensified over time).
144. See id. at 307 (discussing County’s response to Yadlosky’s alleged harassment of another employee).
145. See id. (stating no follow-up action was taken by County after verbal
reprimands).
146. See id. (describing Yadlosky’s reprimands and whether Minarsky knew
about them).
147. See id. at 307–08 (noting Minarsky’s knowledge of Yadlosky making unwanted advances on two other co-workers).
148. See id. at 308 (describing sexual harassment policy). The County’s policy
prohibited “harassment based upon ‘sex, age, race, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, sexual preference and any other protected classification . . . .’ ”
See id. Employees “could report any harassment to their supervisor; if the supervi-
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the supervisor was the source of the harassment, in which case the employees were to report to the Chief County Clerk or a county commissioner.149
Despite her awareness of the policy, Minarsky never reported the harassment to the County Clerk or a county commissioner in part because
Yadlosky told her she could not trust those individuals.150
Minarsky eventually sent an email to Yadlosky, in which she confronted him about his continuously subjecting her to harassment.151
Though this effort did not yield any results, another supervisor reported
Yadlosky’s conduct to the Chief County Clerk after overhearing other employees discussing Yadlosky’s treatment of Minarsky.152 The Chief County
Clerk subsequently interviewed Yadlosky, and Yadlosky was ultimately terminated after admitting to the allegations against him.153
B. She Kept Her Head Down, and Lost: The District Court Found
Minarsky Acted Unreasonably
Minarsky filed a complaint against both Yadlosky and the County.154
Among other claims, Minarsky alleged sexual harassment through a hostile work environment.155 The County asserted the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment.156
The district court held the County satisfied its burden under the first
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, finding the County had a reasonable
policy in place and that it reasonably responded to reported incidents of
sor [was] the source of the harassment, the employee could report this to the
Chief County Clerk or a County Commissioner.” See id.
149. See id. at 308 (describing reporting procedures).
150. See id. (discussing comments made by Yadlosky to Minarsky discouraging
her from reporting). Yadlosky also allegedly told Minarsky “to look busy or else
[the County] would terminate her position.” See id.
151. See id. (quoting text of Minarsky’s email to Yadlosky). In short, Minarsky’s email to Yadlosky addressed Yadlosky’s conduct that she found bothersome
and requested that she and Yadlosky resolve it amongst themselves to avoid the
involvement of the County. See id.
152. See id. at 308–09 (describing events causing Yadlosky’s harassment of
Minarsky to come to light).
153. See id. at 309 (describing events leading to Yadlosky’s termination).
154. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 3:14-CV-2021, 2017 WL 4475978,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017), adopting report and recommendation, 3:14-CV-2021,
2017 WL 4475981 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017), vacated and remanded, 895 F.3d 303 (3d
Cir. 2018) (stating Minarsky sought to hold Susquehanna County liable under Title VII).
155. See id. (noting claim brought by Minarsky). Minarsky brought a hostile
work environment claim in her second amended complaint alleging “that the
County discriminated against her on the basis of sex or gender and otherwise permitted a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . .” See id. Additionally, Minarsky “alleged violations of state law for
discrimination and negligent hiring and supervision.” See id.
156. See id. (noting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both of
Minarsky’s claims for violations of Title VII and state law).
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sexual harassment by Yadlosky.157 As for the second prong, the court
found that Minarsky was familiar with the sexual harassment policy and
that she unreasonably failed to report the harassment.158 Citing
Yadlosky’s explanation that she could not trust those to whom she would
report as the only purported explanation for the delay, the court held
Minarsky’s failure to make a complaint was unreasonable.159
C. The Third Circuit Saw Things Differently
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and ruled in
favor of Minarsky.160 Specifically, it held “a mere failure to report one’s
harassment is not per se unreasonable” and that “the passage of time is just
one factor in the analysis.”161 The court went on to clarify that if “a plaintiff’s genuinely held, subjective belief of potential retaliation from reporting her harassment appears to be well-founded, and a jury could find that
this belief is objectively reasonable,” then an employer’s motion for summary judgment should be denied.162 The court considered several factors
in reaching this conclusion, including Minarsky’s pressing financial circumstances, her supervisor’s hostility, her fear of retaliation, and her fear
that her complaint would not be taken seriously.163

157. See id. at *6 (finding that the County acted reasonably). The district
court stated that “[t]here is no dispute that the County maintained an anti-harassment policy, and that the plaintiff was familiar with it . . . .” See id. The court also
noted that the County “acted swiftly and effectively” when two prior incidents of
harassment involving Yadlosky were brought to its attention. See id.
158. See id. (assessing Minarsky’s actions relating to second prong of FaragherEllerth defense).
159. See id. (reasoning Minarsky’s explanation for her delay in reporting was
unconvincing).
160. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 317 (3d Cir. 2018)
(holding in favor of Minarsky).
161. See id. at 314 (reasoning the circumstances surrounding sexual harassment should factor into the determination of whether the victim acted
reasonably).
162. See id. (clarifying standard for summary judgment on issue of FaragherEllerth defense).
163. See id. (considering context in which harassment occurred). Minarsky
had a daughter who was sick with cancer, which she claimed contributed to her
fear of reporting because she needed the income from her job to pay her medical
bills. See id. The court considered the fact that Minarsky’s supervisor became hostile when she would try to stand up for herself, which she argued added to her fear
of reporting. See id. at 314–15. The court also considered Yadlosky’s assertion that
Minarsky could not trust those to whom she would report the harassment as evidence she acted reasonably. See id. at 316. The court held that when considering
the circumstances surrounding the harassment, a jury could find Minarsky’s actions reasonable. See id. at 314.
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IV. POOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW: COURTS PLACE PLAINTIFFS
UNDER A MICROSCOPE
Rather than fully considering the context in which harassment occurs, many courts focus on evidence, or a lack of evidence, of a credible
threat of retaliation before determining whether an employee-plaintiff’s
delay in reporting or failure to report was reasonable.164 This narrow focus routinely leads courts to grant motions for summary judgment against
employees who delayed reporting because of fears courts categorize as
subjective or general.165 Accordingly, employee-plaintiffs who waited a
few weeks to file a formal complaint may be unable to establish the reasonableness of their acts.166 This application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense
can reward ineffective harassment policies and punish employees that delay reporting for reasons that many may find reasonable.167
A. Watching Employees Through a Narrow Lens
Most courts do not consider the circumstances surrounding instances
of workplace sexual harassment when assessing whether an employee acted reasonably.168 This means that courts may not consider factors relevant in determining whether an employee-plaintiff acted reasonably, such
as how new an employee is to a workplace or whether the employee actually knew that an initial instance of harassment would be the first of
many.169 Further, other factors, such as pressing financial circumstances,
164. For a further discussion on credible threats excusing a delay in reporting, see supra notes 117–30 and accompanying text.
165. For a further discussion on general threats being dismissed, see supra
notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
166. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 881 (discussing consequences of
employees’ failure to complain of harassment). Brake and Grossman believe the
consequences of failing to complain are so severe in part because “courts have
been relatively unwilling to accept excuses and tend, instead, to assume that such a
failure is always ‘unreasonable.’ ” See id. They further note “courts tend to equate
an employer’s formal policy against retaliation with the actual absence of retaliation.” See id. at 881–82; see also Stone, supra note 76, at 54 (reasoning “a plaintiff
will often not be able to produce” evidence necessary to overcome second prong of
defense).
167. See Stone, supra note 76, at 52 (“Policies pass muster despite having flaws
that, it was argued, rendered them overly onerous, if not impossible, to use.”)
168. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 883 (discussing trends in courts
requiring evidence of credible fear). Brake and Grossman write that cases in
which courts require credible threats of retaliation “reflect a widespread refusal by
courts to consider context when making determinations about the reasonableness
of the plaintiff’s behavior.” See id. They further argue this approach acts to “[bar]
employees [sic] access to the law’s substantive protections against harassment.” See
id. Stone, another commentator, has argued that some courts do not factor in the
circumstances causing a victim to not report, “[s]pecifically, the fear that accompanies reporting harassment in an environment in which support and success is uncertain is typically given no weight, absent explicit evidence that a plaintiff will
often not be able to produce.” See Stone, supra note 76, at 53–54.
169. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 883 (mentioning factors courts
do not consider in assessing reasonableness of delay in reporting). Brake and
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which can enhance an employee’s fear of being fired, are often beyond
the scope of courts’ consideration as well.170 Context becomes more important in situations where the harassed employee has very little power in
the workplace, does not fully understand the complaint process, or has
heightened concerns over retaliation.171 There is good reason to consider
such factors, but some courts are not fully weighing their importance.172
The failure to consider context has diminished the importance of the
second prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.173 Two commentators argued that some courts use any delay in reporting to justify allowing an
employer who took both reasonable steps to prevent and promptly corGrossman write that the court “expect[ed the] plaintiff to complain even before
realizing the misconduct would recur and escalate.” See id. at 882 n.119 (citing
Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2000)). These commentators also discuss Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002),
where the employee-plaintiff complained to a supervisor that she was being
harassed, and that supervisor started to harass her as well. See id. at 882–83. In
Wyatt, the employee-plaintiff was being harassed by her supervisor, who would refer “to her in vulgar terms and continually [ask] her to have sex with him.” See
Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 407. The plaintiff reported this conduct to the supervisor’s supervisor, and that individual responded by taking part in the harassing conduct.
See id. The court found the plaintiff did not act unreasonably by reporting her
supervisor’s harassment, but she was acted unreasonably in failing to escalate her
complaints higher up the chain after the supervisor’s supervisor started harassing
her. See id. at 414.
170. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 3:14-CV-2021, 2017 WL 4475978,
at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017), adopting report and recommendation, 3:14-CV-2021,
2017 WL 4475981 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2017), vacated and remanded, 895 F.3d 303 (3d
Cir. 2018) (holding employer met its burden under second prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense despite financial pressures making plaintiff feel as though she could
not leave her job).
171. Retaliation in the Workplace: Causes, Remedies, and Strategies for Prevention:
Before the EEOC (June 17, 2015) (statement of Daniel Werner, Senior Supervising
Attorney, Southern Poverty Law Center), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/
6-17-15/werner.cfm [https://perma.cc/QT5C-XW83] (discussing fears of reporting for low-status employees and harassment). This testimony specifically mentions that employees such as undocumented workers may be more fearful of the
consequences of reporting harassment as they could face deportation. See id.
172. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 728 (arguing courts fail to give adequate
weight to particular factors when assessing employee’s reasonableness). Hebert
has asserted that courts have not considered whether an employee is new or if they
are on probation when determining whether they acted reasonably in failing to
report or delaying reporting. See id. She believes these employees may be more
concerned than others in reporting because “those on probation do not have the
credibility and ‘value’ of longer-term employees and because their jobs are presumably less secure in the first place.” See id. Additionally, Hebert discusses Reed v.
MBNA Marketing Systems, 231 F. Supp. 2d 363 (D. Me. 2002), a case where a supervisor forced a seventeen-year-old employee to perform oral sex on him on two separate occasions, and then implicitly threatened her with retaliation. See id. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and stated, “the plaintiff had not even produced any evidence that she had behaved reasonably under
the circumstances.” See id.
173. See Zev J. Eigen, et al., When Rules are Made to Be Broken, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. 109, 164 (2014) (arguing courts focus almost exclusively on first prong rather
than second prong of Faragher-Ellerth defense).
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rected harassment to avoid liability, meaning courts effectively focus exclusively on the employer’s actions.174 These commentators suggest that in
doing so, courts scrutinize the actions of the plaintiff, leading to holdings
such as a seventeen-day delay being unreasonable.175 Similarly, another
commentator has argued that courts have effectively read the reasonableness requirement of the second prong out of the defense.176 If true, these
observations suggest courts have not been advancing one of the two primary polices of the Faragher-Ellerth defense—to incentivize employees to
act reasonably to mitigate future harm.177
Confining employee-plaintiffs to the bounds of a formal reporting system is yet another unfortunate result of this approach.178 Employees commonly delay reporting or completely fail to formally report harassment,
yet courts often require employees to follow the exact procedures established by an employer.179 The least likely action of an employee who is the
victim of harassment is to file a complaint, therefore, expecting that a reasonable person would follow the formal reporting system creates an apparent paradox.180 While context may explain why employees so often do
174. See id. (“[C]ourts looked to employer behavior to determine whether the
employee’s behavior was reasonable . . . [and] to employer behavior in determining whether the reports were timely.”). Eigen, Menillo & Sherwyn have argued
that courts have “effectively eliminate[d] the Unreasonable Employee Prong of the
defense . . . .” See id.
175. See id. at 156 (citing Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F.
App’x 276, 281 (10th Cir. 2004)) (“The result we have observed suggests that,
when confronted with an employer who corrects well, courts scrutinize the employee’s conduct to find it unreasonable.”).
176. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 720 (“Although the second prong of the
affirmative defense requires the employer to establish that any failure on the part
of the employee to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or remedial actions was ‘unreasonable,’ some courts appear to be quite literally reading that requirement out of the defense.”). But see Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d
303, 311 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The cornerstone of this analysis is reasonableness: the
reasonableness of the employer’s preventative and corrective measures, and the
reasonableness of the employee’s efforts (or lack thereof) to report misconduct
and avoid further harm. Thus, the existence of a functioning anti-harassment policy could prove the employer’s exercise of reasonable care so as to satisfy the first
element of the defense.” (emphasis in original) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998))).
177. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (reasoning Title VII is intended to prevent
harm).
178. See, e.g., Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 251 (2004) (“The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Madray allows an employer to sit passively by until an
employee files a formal complaint using the employer’s designated complaint
channels.”).
179. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty, 895 F.3d 303, 313 n.12 (citing EEOC
study finding employees frequently fail to report harassment); see also Grossman,
supra note 15, at 896 (citing David Sherwyn et al., supra note 16, at 1280) (discussing study finding “only fifteen percent [of victims] reported . . . harassment to
their employers in a timely manner”).
180. See id. at 209 (“Thus, the empirical evidence on reporting raises an interesting question: if the vast majority of harassment victims do not report harass-
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not immediately resort to filing formal complaints, any such facts are beyond the scope of consideration.181 Some courts go even further and essentially require employee-plaintiffs who failed to promptly report
harassment to establish the reasonableness of their delay.182 Courts typically reason that employee reporting is necessary to prevent future harm
when ruling in favor of an employer in these situations.183 This requirement, then the reasonable response is not to report harassment.” See id. (emphasis
in original) (citing Patricia A. Frazier, Overview of Sexual Harassment from the Behavioral Science Perspective, 1998 A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., NAT’L INST.
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, B16, B-21 (1998))); see also Brake & Grossman supra note
15, at 896 (noting infrequency of formal reporting by victims of sexual harassment). A study found that “filing a complaint with an employer sexual is the least
likely response to harassment.” See id. (citing Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 1151, 1155 (2000)). A 1995 study found “only six percent of employees
who had experienced sexual harassment filed a formal complaint, while forty-four
percent took no action at all.” See id. (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note
15, at 30)).
181. See Stone, supra note 76, at 53–54 (“Similarly, courts’ analyses of the second prong of the affirmative defense evince a reluctance to take into account circumstances that might have coerced a harassment victim into failing to utilize a
reporting mechanism. Specifically, the fear that accompanies reporting harassment in an environment in which support and success is uncertain is typically
given no weight, absent explicit evidence that a plaintiff will often not be able to
produce.”).
182. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 715–16 (criticizing perceived burden shifting by courts when applying the Faragher-Ellerth defense). Hebert believes that
some courts have required the “plaintiff to establish the reasonableness of his or
her actions” in the context of the Faragher-Ellerth defense. See id. at 716. Hebert
went on to argue that other courts have continued to place the burden on the
employer but have placed a burden of production on the plaintiff as well. See id.
She wrote:
“[i]n these courts, after the employer has shown that the employee completely failed to use a complaint process, the plaintiff has been required
to come forward with reasons for the failure to use that process, and the
courts have considered the adequacy of those reasons in determining
whether the employer’s burden of persuasion has been carried.”
See id. Ultimately, Hebert believes the Faragher-Ellerth defense has been applied as a
pro-employer standard. See id. at 715.
183. See Stone, supra note 76, at 57–58 (discussing Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003)). Stone acknowledged the
Walton court’s explanation for holding the plaintiff unreasonably failed to follow
the sexual harassment policy, specifically that requiring employees to report harassment through established channels is essential to correcting the problem of
workplace discrimination. See id. at 58–59 (disagreeing with the reasoning of the
Walton court). Nevertheless, Stone believes that the court failed to appropriately
weigh the reasonableness of such a delay in light of the realities of the workplace
that employee-plaintiffs often face. See id. at 59 (discussing workplace conditions
that discourage employees from reporting harassment). Stone points out that an
“unspoken code of conduct” may act to “chill reporting,” pointing out one instance where a plaintiff who was successful in court still faces problems such as her
workers refusing to look at her or talk to her, even five or six years later. See id.
Stone added “courts often adhere rigidly to the requirement that plaintiffs follow
the exact course of action prescribed by a defendant’s policy.” See id. at 58.
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ment does very little, if anything, to prevent workplace sexual harassment
from occurring.184
B. Throwing Away the Handbook: Applying the Faragher-Ellerth Defense
Contrary to the Policy of Title VII
Courts granting summary judgment in favor of an employer without
fully considering the context that may cause a reporting delay is contrary
to the purpose of Title VII.185 As discussed in Part II, the primary objective of Title VII is to avoid harm.186 The Faragher-Ellerth defense seeks to
further this policy by encouraging employers to prevent harm and by encouraging employees to mitigate damages by reporting harassment.187 In
failing to consider context, courts are not accounting for the very conditions that have prevented employees from reporting harassment time and
time again.188 Oddly enough, courts have given great deference to written
sexual harassment policies despite their apparent ineffectiveness.189 This
approach of not considering context represents a trend in which courts
184. See Lawton, supra note 180, at 198 (addressing shortcomings of FaragherEllerth defense). Lawton has argued that “[t]he success of the affirmative defense
as a means to increase deterrence of workplace harassment rests in part on behavior that occurs infrequently—formal reporting of sexual harassment.” See id. Further, according to Lawton, this very premise has made it unlikely from the start
that the Faragher-Ellerth defense would succeed in its goal of deterring workplace
harassment. See id. at 198–99. Lastly, the Faragher-Ellerth defense does little more
to further the goal of the defense on the employer’s end, because “many federal
courts have interpreted the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher to require little
more than what the Court in Meritor commanded: promulgate an anti-harassment
policy that specifically addresses sexual harassment and a grievance procedure that
allows an employee to bypass a harassing supervisor.” See id. at 210.
185. See Stone, supra note 76, at 49–50 (“[T]he current state of the law permits little to no acknowledgement of the realities that often permeate a workplace
in which harassment occurs. These realities both discourage a victim from reporting a hostile environment and unfulfilled threats and force her to quit her employment.”(citing Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ WakeUp Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461 (2002))). “West argues “[e]nough
opinions have been issued under the [Faragher-Ellerth] structure, however, to raise
serious questions about the viability of the affirmative defense in actually preventing hostile environment sexual harassment.” See West, supra, at 461.
186. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (discussing Title VII). The Court specified that “like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, [Title VII] is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” See id. at
806.
187. For a further discussion on the policy behind the Faragher-Ellerth defense
and how the policy was incorporated into the defense, see supra notes 66–72.
188. See West, supra note 187, at 461 (“Courts are dismissing women’s complaints under prong two of the affirmative defense without examining the facts
underlying women’s hesitation to file an internal complaint prior to suing in federal court.”).
189. See Stone, supra note 76, at 52 (“Policies pass muster despite having flaws
that, it was argued, rendered them overly onerous, if not impossible, to use.”); see
also West, supra note 185, at 461 (“[Courts] are interpreting ‘reasonable care’ in
the first prong of the [Faragher-Ellerth] affirmative defense to require only minimal
prevention efforts by the employer.”).
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have attempted to mitigate harm to employees by rewarding ineffective
sexual harassment policies and punishing those who act as 94% of people
who experience workplace sexual harassment do.190
V.

REWRITING

RULES OF THE WORKPLACE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PUTS THINGS INTO PERSPECTIVE

THE

In Minarsky, the Third Circuit set out a standard that gives courts
more flexibility when determining whether a plaintiff acted reasonably,
and this standard is more consistent with the language of Faragher and
Ellerth opinions, as well as the policy underlying Title VII.191 The Third
Circuit accomplished this, in part, by holding a delay in reporting was just
one factor in assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s actions, which
effectively diminishes the importance of prompt employee reporting.192
In reaching this holding, the court deviated from its own precedent, which
often required evidence of a credible threat.193 This deviation may be
explained by societal change, which is suggested by a footnote in Minarsky
that discusses the “#MeToo” movement.194 Minarsky applied a reasonableness standard that gives greater weight to the most common response to
190. For a further discussion on the frequency of employees reporting harassment, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
191. For a further discussion on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Minarsky, see
supra notes 137–63 and accompanying text.
192. See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“[T]he passage of time is just one factor in the [reasonableness analysis under the
second prong of Faragher-Ellerth].”).
193. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff did not act unreasonably despite four-year reporting delay because plaintiff
informally complained of harassment to harassing supervisors and two others prior
to filing formal complaint); see also Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 329
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding no reasonable jury could find employer liable where plaintiff failed to report alleged harassment for ten years); Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc.,
174 F. App’x 18, 26 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding four month delay in reporting not
unreasonable); Newsome v. Admin. Office of the Courts of N.J., 51 F. App’x 76,
80–81 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff’s failure to file complaint for two years unreasonable in part because of plaintiff’s failure to file informal complaint).
194. See Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12 (discussing Minarsky’s claim in cultural
context). In a footnote, the Third Circuit discussed the series of formerly undisclosed allegations of sexual harassment that have come to light recently. See id.
The court also cited several studies documenting the failure of many women to
come forward to report their harassment, as well as several proposed explanations
for this phenomenon. See id. The court further noted “[i]n nearly all of the instances, the victims asserted a plausible fear of serious adverse consequences had
they spoken up at the time that the conduct occurred.” See id. Further, “there may
be a certain fallacy that underlies the notion that reporting sexual misconduct will
end it.” See id. Finally, the court stated “[v]ictims do not always view it in this way.
Instead they anticipate negative consequences or fear that the harassers will face
no reprimand; thus, more often than not, victims choose not to report the harassment.” See id.
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sexual harassment, in contrast to other cases which hold a delay in reporting is per se unreasonable.195
The approach taken by the Third Circuit in Minarsky draws on how
people actually respond to harassment.196 Considering most people do
not formally report harassment, and very few employees immediately resort to formal reporting, whether an employee promptly files a formal
complaint should not be the sole focus of the reasonableness inquiry.197
The Third Circuit’s reasonableness inquiry takes into account the employee’s fear of retaliation, confidentiality, harm, impairment of career
prospects, blame for the supervisor’s conduct, and even the financial distress that may result from the employee losing their job.198 The prevalence of these beliefs among victimized employees, and the frequency with
which they cause those employees to delay reporting, suggests that a jury
should have the opportunity to weigh whether or not the plaintiff acted
reasonably.199
Taking context into consideration may lead to employers being more
proactive in preventing sexual harassment in the workplace.200 Rather
195. Compare, e.g., id. at 314 (holding delay in reporting is just one factor in
Faragher-Ellerth analysis), with Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034
(E.D. Mo. 2000) (finding employee-plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of
preventive or correct opportunities by waiting three months to report
harassment).
196. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 734–35 (discussing victims’ responses to harassment). Hebert stated that “relatively few women subjected to sexual harassment
make formal complaints about that behavior.” See id. at 734 (citing Sandy Welsh &
James E. Gruber, Not Taking It Any More: Women Who Report of File Complaints of
Sexual Harassment, 36 CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 559, 559–60
(1999)). Hebert argued that courts holding plaintiffs act unreasonably by failing
to report their harassers is concerning, as not formally reporting is the most common response to sexual harassment. See id. at 735. Hebert took further issue with
judges making this determination despite being far less likely to be subjected to
harassing conduct in light of their positions. See id. Hebert proposed the reason
that judges view the prompt reporting requirement as the ideal method of addressing harassment is “because formal procedures are seen as the most effective manner in which sexual harassment can be prevented before it occurs, becomes
serious, or otherwise corrected after it occurs.” See id.; see also Minarsky, 895 F.3d at
314 (holding jury could find plaintiff’s actions despite plaintiff never formally reporting supervisor’s harassment).
197. See Lawton, supra note 178 at 209 (asserting it is reasonable for victims to
not report harassment considering most victims fail to do so).
198. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 737 (“These reasons include fear of retaliation, concerns about confidentiality and whether any action would be taken, concern about harm to the harasser, and concerns about harm to themselves,
including suffering damage to their careers, being blamed for the harassment, and
not being believed.”); see also Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 307 (stating Minarsky relied on
income from her job to pay for her daughter’s cancer treatment).
199. See Hebert, supra note 17, at 742–43 (asserting most women act reasonably by not immediately filing a formal complaint in light of “the likely consequences that they would face if they made such a formal complaint”).
200. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 883 (reasoning courts fail to
consider context causing them to consider plaintiffs’ delays in reporting or failure
to report unreasonable). Failing to fully consider the circumstances in which har-
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than implementing policies that fit minimal requirements and have no
real impact on rates of workplace harassment, holding employers to a
higher standard would create an incentive to develop effective procedures
that could prevent the harassment from ever occurring.201 This outcome
is possible, given employers are often in the best position to prevent
harassment.202
VI. CREATING

A

LESS HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

The Minarsky approach advances the policy underlying the FaragherEllerth defense while acknowledging that in some circumstances it is understandable why employees do not immediately report harassment.203 The
Minarsky opinion represents an approach to the Faragher-Ellerth defense
that deviates from that of nearly every other circuit, but is still consistent
with the case law and policy underlying the defense.204 If followed by
other courts, the added flexibility provided by the Minarsky approach may
lead to decisions that many regard as fairer to plaintiffs.205 But based on
the long-established precedent of other circuits, any change is likely to be
incremental.206
assment occurs results in more plaintiffs losing on motions for summary judgment.
See id. By plaintiffs overcoming the obstacle of summary judgment, employers will
have increased pressure to settle claims to avoid further litigation, which may
prompt them to be more proactive in the prevention of sexual harassment. See
Robert R. Graham III, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Need to Revisit the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423,
442–43 (2016) (reasoning sexual harassment cases put pressure on employers to
settle); see also Grossman, supra note 104, at 71 (noting “employer exercise [significant control] over the workplace and their ability to establish norms of respect and
equality, to respond to problems in a manner that both resolves them and encourages future victims to come forward, and to discipline offenders.”).
201. See Grossman, supra note 104, at 71 (arguing potential costs of sexual
assault claims incentivize employers to prevent harassment); see also West, supra
note 185, at 461 (“[Courts] are interpreting ‘reasonable care’ in the first prong of
the new affirmative defense to require only minimal prevention efforts by the
employer.”).
202. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (reasoning
employers are in best position to prevent harassment from occurring).
203. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding in Minarsky, see
supra notes 137–63 and accompanying text.
204. Compare Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2018)
(finding reasonableness of both employer and employee to be at center of inquiry), with Hebert, supra note 15, at 720 (“Although the second prong of the
affirmative defense requires the employer to establish that any failure on the part
of the employee to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or remedial actions was ‘unreasonable,’ some courts appear to be quite literally reading that requirement out of the defense.”).
205. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding in Minarsky, see
supra notes 137–63 and accompanying text.
206. For a further discussion on the approach to the Faragher-Ellerth defense
taken by other courts, see supra notes 80–136 and accompanying text.
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Such incremental change can already be seen in at least one Pennsylvania decision, and other courts should follow suit.207 The consequences of this shift will likely be two-fold: more plaintiffs will survive
motions for summary judgment, and employers may be incentivized to
take more reasonable measures to prevent sexual harassment from occurring in the first place.208 If this proves to be true, the modified application of the defense will surely prevent future harm, which is what the
defense set out to do at its inception over twenty years ago.209
207. See Kastanidis v. Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 1:16-CV-1548, 2018 WL
3584976, at *10 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2018) (“The mere failure to report sexual harassment ‘is not per se unreasonable.’ ”). In Kastanidis, the plaintiff never actually
used the formal reporting procedure established by the employer. See id. at *10.
208. For a further discussion of the potential for the Minarsky approach to
prevent future instances of harassment, see supra notes 203–09 and accompanying
text.
209. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (reasoning
Title VII is intended to prevent harm).
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